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1992]
HEALTH

LAW-FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE MEDICARE BALANCE
BILLING REGULATIONS

Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Marconis (199 1)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is facing a growing health care crisis. This crisis
presents two interrelated challenges. The first challenge is to provide
universal access to adequate health care; the second is to place a reasonable limit on the cost of that care.' In the public sector, the Federal
Medicare program, which provides health insurance to persons over
sixty-five, is in the center of the maelstrom.2 In the last decade, Congress has struggled to maximize access to high quality health care while
minimizing the cost for those with Medicare insurance.3 Congress has
sought to achieve this balance by encouraging, but not requiring, physicians to accept a standardized fee for patients with Medicare insurance,
and by limiting the amount that physicians who do not accept the standardized fee can charge in excess of that fee. 4 Unsatisfied with the balance struck by Congress, several states have enacted statutes that restrict
the billing options physicians can choose when treating Medicare
5
patients.
1. See Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842, 851-52 (3d
Cir. 1991); see also Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barners to Increasing
Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 255 (1990); Judith
Feder, Health Care of the Disadvantaged: The Elderly, 15J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
259 (1990); Paul B. Ginsburg, Alternative Approaches to Health Care Cost Containment, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 447 (1990).

2. In 1986, the United States spent $458 billion (10.9% of the Gross National Product) on health care. Payments; Currents, HOSPITALS, Aug. 5, 1987, at
22. Medicare accounted for 19% of those expenditures. Id.; see also Ginsburg,
supra note 1, at 448.
3. For a discussion of recent amendments to the Medicare Act, see infra
notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
4. See Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 843-45 (discussing the recent

evolution of fee caps in the Medicare Act); see also, Ginsburg, supra note 1. For a
discussion of Medicare billing practices, see infra notes 15-32 and accompanying
text.
5. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 2 (West Supp. 1991) (requiring that
physicians who treat patients with Medicare insurance accept assignment for
those patients as a condition of licensure); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 449.31449.36 (Supp. 1991) (banning balance billing of patients with Medicare insurance); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 6501-6508 (1991) (requiring that physicians
who treat patients with Medicare insurance accept assignment for those patients
as a condition of licensure).
In addition, between 1987 and 1989, 18 states, including Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New

Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Ohio, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Wyoming, considered but did not pass laws restricting balance billing.

(1064)
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In an effort to limit the cost of health care for the elderly, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Pennsylvania Health Care Practitioners
Medicare Fee Control Act (FCA). 6 The FCA prohibits physicians who
treat Medicare patients from billing those patients in excess of the recognized payment amount established by the Medicare program. 7 In the
Physician Payment Review Commission, 1989 Annual Report to Congress, Appendix F p. 371 n.4.
For a definition of the term "balance billing," see infra note 7 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the term "balance billing," see infra notes 20-23
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the term "assignment," see infra
notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 449.31-449.36 (Supp. 1991). In particular,
§ 449.32 sets out the purposes for the legislation:
Legislative Finding-The General Assembly finds that there exists
in this Commonwealth a major crisis because of the continuing escalation of costs for health care services. Because of the continuing escalation of costs, an increasingly large number of Pennsylvania citizens
have severely limited access to appropriate and timely health care. Senior citizens and the disabled are disadvantaged by the continuing escalation of costs for health care services. Increasing costs are also
undermining the quality of health care services currently being provided. Further, the continuing escalation is negatively affecting the
economy of this Commonwealth and is restricting new economic
growth and impeding the creation of new job opportunities in this
Commonwealth.
Id. § 449.32(a).
7. Id. Section 449.34 of the FCA provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
health care practitioner, or any primary health center, corporation, facility, institution or other entity that employs a health care practitioner, to balance bill."
Id. § 449.34.
The term "balance billing" is defined in § 449.33 of the FCA as: "To
charge or collect from a beneficiary of ...the Medicare Program, an amount in
excess of the reasonable charge for the service provided, as determined by the
United States Secretary of Health and Human Services." Id. § 449.33.
Although both the Third Circuit and the FCA use the phrase "reasonable
charge," recent changes in the Medicare Act make the phrase obsolete. For a
discussion of those changes, see infra notes 15 & 24. In its place the phrase
"recognized payment amount" will be used. As defined in the Medicare Act,
this phrase is equivalent to both the phrase "reasonable charge" and the current
equivalent of this phrase. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(D) (1988).
Penalties for violation of § 449.34 of the FCA are provided in § 449.35 of
the FCA. Section 449.35 establishes the following penalties:
(A) GENERAL PENALTIES.-If

a person violates section 4, the licensing

board .. .shall do the following:
(1) Publicly reprimand the violator.
(2) Order the violator to repay the victim the amount of excess payments made and received, plus interest on that amount at the maximum
legal rate from the date payment was made until the date repayment is
made.
(B) ADDITIONAL VIOLATIONS.-If

a person violates section 4 more than

once, the penalties set forth in subsection (a) shall again be ordered. In
addition, the following penalties shall be imposed:
(1) For a second violation, a fine of $2,000.
(2) For a third violation, a fine of $5,000.
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jargon of the Medicare program, the FCA bans "balance billing." 8 In
Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Marconis,9 the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Third Circuit upheld the FCA against a challenge based on
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 10
At the time of its decision in Pennsylvania Medical Society, the Third

Circuit was only the second federal appellate court to consider the issue
of whether state restrictions on Medicare balance billing are preempted
by the Medicare Act. With its decision, the Third Circuit joined the First
Circuit in upholding such legislation. I Subsequently, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York decided a similar
12
issue in accord with the First and Third Circuits.
II.
A.

CASE ANALYSIS

Background

Medicare, a federally funded program administered by the Department of Health and Human Services, provides health insurance for all
persons who are sixty-five and older. 13 Part B of the Medicare program
provides for the payment of physicians for their services.' 4 Medicare,
however, does not cover the full cost of these services. Instead, the Department of Health and Human Services has established a "recognized
payment amount" for each potential service.1 5 For any given procedure
(3) For a fourth or subsequent violation, a fine of $1000 or more than
the last fine imposed.
(E) EXCEPTIONs.-No penalty imposed under this section shall be considered cause to withhold, suspend or revoke the license of a health
care practitioner by a licensing board.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 449.35.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 449.34.
9. 942 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1991).
10. Id. at 857; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. See Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 796-97 (1st
Cir. 1987). In Massachusetts Medical Society, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit upheld a Massachusetts statute prohibiting balance billing of
patients with Medicare insurance. Id. The court held that the statute was not
preempted by federal legislation and that the statute did not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
12. See Medical Soc'y of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 777 F. Supp. 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
In Medical Society of New York, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York upheld a New York statute that limited the amount physicians could balance bill to less than the amount permitted under the federal
Medicare Act. Id. at 1158. The court held that the state statute is not preempted by the Medicare Act and that the state statute does not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396(d)(1988).
14. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 843 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j1395w). Part A, covering hospitalization and institutional charges, is not implicated here. See id.
15. Id. at 843 n.2. As the Third Circuit noted, the "reasonable charge is
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or service, Medicare pays eighty percent of the recognized payment
amount, and the patient is expected to pay the remaining twenty
percent. 16

Pursuant to this basic structure, Medicare reimburses physicians in
one of two ways. A physician can either choose to accept assignment or
charge on the basis of an itemized bill. 17 If a physician chooses to accept assignment, he or she agrees to accept the recognized payment
amount as full payment.' 8 Accordingly, a physician who accepts assignment bills Medicare directly for eighty percent of the recognized payment amount and bills the patient for the remaining twenty percent. 19
Alternatively, a physician can choose to charge on the basis of an
itemized bill. 20 In this case, the physician must bill the patient directly
for 100% of the "actual charge," and then Medicare will reimburse the
patient for eighty percent of the recognized payment amount. 2 1 Physicians who choose this option can bill a patient in excess of the recognized payment amount. 2 2 This practice, called "balance billing," is
2
prohibited by the FCA.

3

This basic outline of how physicians are reimbursed for their services under Medicare is complicated by a number of amendments to the
Medicare Act affected by recent federal budget agreements. 24 In an efdetermined from a complicated set of formulae found in the Medicare Act." Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395u(b)(3), 1395x(v) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); 42
C.F.R. §§ 404.502-.504 (1990). Commencing in 1992, the "reasonable charge"
system was replaced with a national fee schedule. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)(2)
(Supp. I 1989). While the national fee schedule radically altered the way in
which the recognized payment amount is determined, the change has no impact
on the application of the FCA. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(l)(a)(1). The portion paid by the patient is commonly
referred to as a co-payment. See Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 844.

17. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(B).
18. Id. § 1395u(b)(3)(B)(ii).
19. Pennsylvania Medical Soc 'y, 942 F.2d at 844 (discussing the basic mechanics of Medicare billing practices). Billing Medicare directly is the most obvious
advantage of accepting assignment because the physician is guaranteed prompt
payment of at least 80% of the recognized payment amount. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(B)(i). Charging on the basis of an itemized bill
is by definition equivalent to "not accepting assignment." Id.
21. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 844. One of the obvious disadvantages to directly billing the patient for 100% of the actual charge is that the
physician takes the risk that the patient will be delinquent in paying the bill. Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(B).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 449.32(b) (Supp. 1991). For the text of particular sections of the FCA, see supra notes 6-7.
24. See Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 843-45. Of particular impor-

tance are the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA '86) and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989 (OBRA '89). Id.
DEFRA is responsible for creating the Participating Physicians Program
(PPP) and a number of incentives to encourage participation in the program. Id.
at 844; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(h)(l) (1988). The PPP allows physicians to
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fort to reduce health care costs for persons over sixty-five, Congress has
sought to encourage physicians to accept assignment and to forego balance billing.2 5 As part of this effort, Congress created the Participating
Physicians Program (ppp).26 Physicians who choose to join the PPP
agree on an annual basis to accept assignment for all services provided
27
to their Medicare patients.
In addition to the significant incentives for participation in the PPP,
Congress has placed significant limits on the billing practices of physicians who choose not to participate.2 8 First, Congress has banned balance billing for patients covered by both Medicare and Medicaid-those
who are both elderly and poor.2 9 Second, for all other Medicare patients, Congress has limited the amount physicians can bill in excess of
30
the recognized payment amount.
Despite the restrictions and disincentives placed upon balance billing, Congress has not banned the practice altogether. 3 ' On the other
hand, Congress has not acted to protect balance billing by expressly pre32
empting known state restrictions.
B.

ProceduralHistory

The Pennsylvania Medical Society (PMS), the American Medical Association (AMA), the Crawford County Medical Society (CCMS) and an
individual physician who provided services to Medicare beneficiaries,
choose to accept assignment for all Medicare patients on an annual basis. Id.
Incentives for participation in the PPP include listing in a national directory
made available to Medicare beneficiaries and permission to charge five percent

more for any given service than a non-participating physician. Id. § 1395u(h)(4)(6).
OBRA '86 included a new system of price control for non-participating physicians by placing an across-the-board limit on charges called "maximum allowable actual charges" or MAAC's. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 844. In
addition, OBRA '86 created the Physicians Payment Review Commission
(PPRC) "as an advisory body to Congress to submit annual recommendations
for rates and methods of payment for services under Medicare Part B." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-l(a), 1395(b)(1) (1988)).
OBRA '89 banned balance billing for people eligible for both Medicare and
Medicaid and established a new system for limiting balance billing by non-participating physicians based on "limited charges." Id. at 85. The limiting charges
were set to gradually reduce the amount a non-participating physician could
charge in excess of the "required payment amount" over the course of several
years. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g) (1988).
25. Pennsylvania Medical Society, 942 F.2d at 844-45.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(h)(1).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(h)(1).
28. For a discussion of incentives for participation in the PPP, see supra
note 24 and text accompanying notes 25-30.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)(3).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g).
31. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842, 848 (3d Cir.

1991).
32. Id. at 849.
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brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania against the members of the Pennsylvania State Board of
Medicine. 3 3 As plaintiffs, and later as appellants, they sought to prove
that the FCA violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 3 4 They argued that the Medicare statute and its legislative history show congressional intent to preempt regulation of balance billing
by the states.3 5 At trial, the district court held that the FCA was valid
and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.3 6 The
PMS, the AMA, the CCMS and the individual physician appealed the
37
district court's decision.
C. Analysis
On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed the preemption arguments
made by the appellants in two parts. First, the court determined that the
FCA was entitled to a presumption of validity.3 8 Second, the court considered and rejected the appellants' substantive preemption arguments.39 In upholding the FCA, the Third Circuit determined that the
appellants did not provide "clear and manifest" evidence that Congress
intended to occupy the field of Medicare billing practices to the exclusion of the states. 40 The Third Circuit also concluded that the FCA's
ban on balance billing does not pose an obstacle to the accomplishment
4
of the goals of the Medicare program. '
1.

The Initial Presumption

The decisive issue in Pennsylvania Medical Society was whether the
FCA is entitled to a presumption of validity. In general, a state statute is
entitled to a presumption of validity if it regulates a field historically
within state police power. 42 This presumption places "a heavy burden
[on the party arguing for preemption] of proving that preemption was
33. Id. at 845 (discussing the procedural history of this case); Pennsylvania
Medical Soc'y v. Marconis, 755 F. Supp. 1305, 1305 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 942 F.2d
842 (3d Cir. 1991).
34. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 755 F. Supp. at 1306.

35. Id. at 1308-13.
36. Id. at 1314.
37. See Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 842.

38. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the presumption of
validity, see infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
39. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of appellants' substantive preemptive arguments, see infra notes 52-90 and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of appellants' "occupation of the field" arguments, see infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
41. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of appellants' arguments
regarding the goals of the Medicare program, see infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.

42. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 846 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. v.
State Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983) (discussing state
authority to regulate utilities)).
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Relying on the

Supreme Court's decision in Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Company,44 the

appellants argued that this presumption of validity only applies to neutral state laws of general application. 4 5 They further argued that the
presumption does not apply to state laws, such as the FCA, which only
46
function to regulate federal legislation (i.e., non-neutral state laws).
The Third Circuit rejected the appellants' interpretation of
Schneidewind. The Third Circuit explained that in Schneidewind, congressional intent to occupy the field at issue was clear. 4 7 The Third Circuit
stated that when such intent is clear, state statutes are not presumed
48
valid.
In the present case, the FCA regulates matters within the traditional
state police powers, namely, health care. 4 9 Further, appellants failed to
show clear congressional intent to preempt state restrictions on balance
billing, as was demonstrated by the plaintiffs in Schneidewind.50 Thus, the
Third Circuit concluded that the FCA is entitled to a presumption of
43. Id.

44. 485 U.S. 293 (1988). In Schneidewind, natural gas companies challenged
the validity of a Michigan statute that required them to obtain state agency approval before issuing long-term securities. Id. at 295-98. The natural gas companies successfully argued that the state statute was implicitly preempted by
federal regulation pursuant to the National Gas Act. Id. at 300-11.
45. Pennsylvania Medical Soc 'y, 942 F.2d at 846- 47.
46. Id.

47. Id. at 847. The Third Circuit stated:
The appellants' reliance on Schneidewind is misplaced because Congress

intended to preempt state regulation of rates and facilities of natural gas
companies and it was clear that the Natural Gas Act was intended by

Congress to occupy this field. Accordingly, the issue [in Schneidewind]
was not whether Congress intended to preempt state regulation in the
occupied area. Rather, it was whether the state statute amounted to
such regulation.
Id. The Third Circuit then pointed out that the issue in the case at bar concerned congressional intent. Id.
48. Id. The court specifically stated that "the non-neutral statute at issue in
Schneidewind was not entitled to a presumption of validity ...because congressional intent otherwise was clear." Id.
49. Id. The district court characterized the FCA as a regulation of public
health, and as such is a matter well within traditional state police power. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Marconis, 755 F. Supp. 1305, 1308 (W.D. Pa.) (citing
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1985)), aff'd, 942 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1991); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir.,
1984); Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n v. Dukakis, 726 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1984)).
The Third Circuit cited to the district court's characterization with approval, adding that § 1395 of the Medicare Act makes it clear that the Medicare provisions
are to be limited in their intrusion on state authority over regulation of public
health. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 846 n.4 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395
(West 1983 & Supp. 1991)).
For a discussion of the dissent's conflicting view on this issue, see supra
notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
50. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 847.
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51

validity.

2.

Substantive Arguments

Because the Medicare Act does not provide for express preemption,
appellants were required to demonstrate that congressional intent to
preempt state regulation of Medicare balance billing is implied in the
Medicare Act. 52 Appellants were required to show either that Congress
51. Id. at 848. This summary of the court's reasoning does not do justice to
its apparent circularity. The court's own langauge is as follows:
The licensing and regulation of physicians is a state function. Appellants have failed to prove otherwise. Thus, the state regulation is presumed valid. To rebut this presumption, appellants must show that
Congress intended to displace the state's police power function. Appellants seek to avoid this burden of proof by imposing a condition on
the presumption. Appellants would have the police powers presumption be proven legitimate before they are required to rebut it. This
begs the question and incorrectly shifts the burden of proof. It is up to
the appellants to prove the presumption invalid, either by showing the area
regulated is not in an area of traditional state regulation or by showing
that Congress intended to displace this function. Until they do so, the presumption remains.
Id. at 847 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The Third Circuit reasoned that the presumption of validity applies unless
Congress' intent to preempt is clear. Id. The problem with this reasoning is that
where Congress' intent to preempt is clear, the presumption is already rebutted.
The court appears to be saying that the presumption does not apply if it is rebutted. If that is the case, it is the Third Circuit rather than appellants who beg the
question.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York took
a much different approach than did the Third Circuit to distinguish Schneidewind.
See Medical Soc'y of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 777 F. Supp. 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The
court in Medical Society of New York held that Schneidewind involved state regulation
of a field not within traditional state power. Id. at 1161 n.3. The court stated
that "[t]he regulation of natural gas [at issue in Schneidewind] has a much firmer
basis of Congressional power-under the Constitution's Commerce Clausethan does the regulation of public health and welfare. The latter lies historically
within the state sphere." Id.
In PennsylvaniaMedical Society, the Third Circuit rejected appellants' reliance
on a series of Supreme Court cases, in addition to Schneidewind, which involved
non-neutral state statutes. Pennsylvania Medical Soc 'y, 942 F.2d at 848. The Third
Circuit stated that these Supreme Court cases "stand for the unexceptional
point that in the face of a demonstration of a congressional intent to preempt, a
state law will be invalidated." Id. (rejecting appellants' reliance on Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv. Inc.,
486 U.S. 825 (1988) andJersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d
1103, 1102-13 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986)).
52. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 848 (citing California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v.Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) for the general proposition that preemption is a question of congressional intent).
There are two ways to show implicit preemption. Id. at 848. First, Congress
"may indicate an intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state law
where the pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation by
the states." Id. Second, state law is implicitly preempted where it conflicts with
federal law such that "it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law,
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intended to occupy the field of balance billing practices to the exclusion
of the states or that the FCA presents an obstacle to accomplishing the
goals of the Medicare program. 53 In addition, because the FCA is presumed valid, appellants had the burden of proving "that preemption
was the 'clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' -54
a.

Occupying the Field of Medicare Billing Practices

The Third Circuit first considered the issue of whether Congress'
intent to preempt states from regulating balance billing could be inferred from Congress' intent to occupy the field of regulating balance
billing practices. 55 First, the appellants argued that the size of the Medicare program is indicative of congressional intent to preempt state regulation. 56 In particular, they argued that the fact that the program is
entirely funded and administered by the federal government shows Congress' intent to occupy the field of regulating medicare billing practices. 5 7 Second, the appellants argued that the complexity and
pervasiveness of federal regulations concerning balance billing show
Congress' intent to occupy the field. 58 They further argued that congressional action in regulating Medicare billing practices should be
given more weight than Congress' failure to provide an express preemp59
tion provision.
In rejecting the appellants' first argument, the Third Circuit reasoned that the appropriation of large sums of federal money does not
necessarily indicate congressional intent to occupy the field. 60 The
court analogized the federal funding of the Medicare program to the
federal funding of highway construction, which leaves traffic regulation
to the states. 6 1 The Third Circuit also rejected the appellants' argument
that the complexity and pervasiveness of the federal Medicare balance
or if the state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress in enacting the federal legislation." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 846 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Res. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983)).
55. Id. at 849.
56. Id. at 850.
57. Id. ("[A]ppellants claim that the size of the Medicare Program, particularly the vast sums spent on it each year and the fact that the program is administered exclusively by the Department of Health and Human Services and selected
insurance carriers, reveals congressional intent to occupy the field.").
58. Id. ("[A]ppellants argue that by enacting a pervasive and complex
scheme for regulating balance billing, Congress 'left no room' for state legislation in this area.").
59. Id. ("[A]pellants urge that the district court erred by giving greater
weight to congressional inaction regarding a preemption provision than to the
detailed and comprehensive Medicare provisions [Congress] did enact.").
60. Id.
61. Id. ("Congress appropriates large sums of money to many programs,
yet does not necessarily intend to preempt state action in the areas involved.").
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billing regulation implied a congressional intent to preempt. 62 The
court determined that, given the legislative history of the Medicare Act,
the complexity and pervasiveness is indicative of just the opposite
63
inference.
The Third Circuit emphasized that it was bound by the Supreme
Court's decision in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra64 in
which the Court held that "when Congress remains silent regarding the
preemptive effect of its legislation on state laws it knows to be in existence at the time of such legislation's passing, Congress has failed to
evince the requisite clear and manifest purpose to supersede those state
laws." '6 5 In applying the Guerra rule, the Third Circuit pointed out that
Congress chose not to expressly preempt state restrictions on Medicare
balance billing, even though it had been informed that many states had
enacted or considered such restrictions. 66 The Third Circuit reasoned
that application of the rule in Guerra was particularly appropriate in this
case for two reasons. 6 7 First, Congress has exercised extraordinary
oversight of the Medicare program. 6 8 Second, Congress was aware of
the unsuccessful Supremacy Clause challenge to a Massachusetts statute
69
banning balance billing.
To further support its conclusion that Congress did not intend to
preempt state regulation of Medicare billing practices, the Third Circuit
cited a House Budget Committee Report associated with the 1989
amendments to the Medicare Act as evidence of congressional intent
62. Id.
63. Id. ("[A]lithough the complexity of the Medicare Program might in
some circumstances support the inference that Congress intended its regulation
of Medicare Physician billing practices to be exclusive, we are dealing with an
unusual situation.").
64. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
65. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 850 (citing Guerra, 479 U.S. at
287-88. In Guerra, the Supreme Court held that a California statute requiring
employers to provide leave and reinstatement to pregnant women was not preempted by Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Guerra,
479 U.S. at 292. The Court was influenced in part by the fact that Congress was
aware of state laws, such as the California statute, when it enacted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act but "failed to evince the requisite 'clear and manifest purpose' to supersede them." Id. at 288 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)).
66. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 851. Before the 1989 amendments, the PPRC gave a report to Congress which included an appendix listing
the four states that had statutes restricting balance billing and the 18 states that
had considered such statutes. Id. For a list of states restricting Medicare balance
billing, see supra note 5. For a discussion of the PPRC, see supra note 24.
67. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 850-51.
68. Id. at 850. "[I1n this case silence is particularly indicative of congressional intent given the extraordinary oversight of the Medicare program as evidenced by the very existence of the [PPRC] with its annual reports to Congress
and by the frequent amendment of the Medicare Act." Id.
69. Id. at 851. For a discussion of this unsuccessful challenge, see infra
notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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regarding state regulation of Medicare balance billing practices. 70 The
report contained the following statement: " '[T]he Committee intends
that nothing in this section would prejudice the right of any State to
require assignment on Medicare claims as a condition of licensure in the
State.' "71 The Third Circuit stated that "this is the only legislative
statement of which we are aware clearly indicating Congressional intent
regarding preemption and it strongly indicates that preemption was not
72
intended."
Finally, the Third Circuit cited its decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Commissionerfor the proposition that "the comprehensive nature of a
federal regulatory scheme, by itself, is not sufficient to preempt all state
regulation." ' 73 In fact, the court noted that in Ford Motor, it had stated
that the absence of an express preemption provision in such a detailed
74
regulatory scheme indicates that Congress did not intend preemption.
In light of the relevant legislative history, precedent and the interpretation of the Medicare Act itself, the Third Circuit concluded that the
appellants in the present case were unable to provide the clear and manifest evidence of congressional intent to occupy the field of Medicare
75
billing practices necessary to meet their burden of proof.
b.

Obstacle to the Goals of Medicare

The Third Circuit then considered and rejected the appellants' arguments that the FCA's ban on balance billing interfered with several
key objectives of the Medicare program. 76 The appellants argued that
70. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 851.

71. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1008 (1989),
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2479).
72. Id. While the Third Circuit found this statement of legislative intent
persuasive, other courts have refused to attach any significance to it. Cf Medical
Soc'y of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 777 F. Supp. 1157, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting
defendants' reliance on committee report); Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Marconis, 755 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 n.7 (W.D. Pa.) (rejecting defendants' reliance on
committee report), aft'd, 942 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1991). Other courts rejected
reliance on this committee report because Congress did not adopt the statement
in the amendments and because the Committee Report was superseded by a
Conference Report which did not include the same language. See Medical Soc'y of
N.Y., 777 F. Supp. at 1163; Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 755 F. Supp. at 1310 n.7.

73. Pennsylvania Medical Soc y,942 F.2d at 851 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 874 F.2d 926, 939 (3d Cir. 1989)). In Ford Motor, the Third
Circuit held that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting affiliations between insurance companies and savings and loans institutions was not entirely preempted.
Ford Motor Co., 874 F.2d at 940.

The PennsylvaniaMedical Soc'y court rejected appellants' attempt to limit the
application of FordMotor to statutes dealing with agency regulation. Pennsylvania
Medical Socy, 942 F.2d at 851 n.6.
74. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 851 (citing Ford Motor Co., 874

F.2d at 939).
75. Id.

76. Id. at 851-52. One argument which the court noted, but which was apparently not raised on appeal, was that a ban on balance billing would interfere
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the FCA's ban would reduce access to health care and increase overall
Medicare costs.

77

The Third Circuit conceded that if the appellants

could support these hypotheses, they would have a strong interference
argument. 7 8 The court, however, concluded that the record contained
no evidence to support the appellants' assertions, and that such theories
were "sheer speculation" and "pure conjecture." 79 In addition, the
court reasoned that if such problems actually arose, Congress is free to
80
amend the Medicare Act to address them.
The appellants also attempted to analogize their case to Pokorny v.
Ford Motor Co. 81 In Pokorny, the Third Circuit held that the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which gave manufacturers certain
options for vehicle design, preempted a Pennsylvania common law action against the Ford Motor Company for negligent design, because the
allegedly negligent design was one of the permitted options. 82 The
Pennsylvania Medical Society court noted that in Pokorny, it was clear that
Congress intended to give manufacturers the right to choose among
several options. 83 The court found that in Pennsylvania Medical Society,
however, it was far from clear that Congress intended to guarantee physicians the option to balance bill, especially considering the fact that
Congress has not expressly preempted state restrictions on balance
billing.

84

with the Medicare program requirement that physicians voluntarily accept assignment. Id. at 852. The Third Circuit noted the district court's response to
this argument that " 'voluntary' referred to voluntariness from the federal perspective." Id. In other words, the voluntary provision meant only that no federal Medicare provision could coerce a physician to accept assignment. Id.
77. Id. at 852-53. Appellants argued that fewer physicians would be willing
to treat Medicare patients if they were limited to charging the recognized payment amount. Id. at 852. Appellants also argued that reducing the out-ofpocket cost of particular services would cause patients to seek more of those
services, thereby increasing overall costs to the federal government. Id. at 853.
78. Id. at 853. The Third Circuit acknowledged that a state law that frustrated the objectives of federal legislation would be preempted even though
compliance with one would not require violation of the other. Id.
79. Id. Before moving for summary judgment in the district court, the parties agreed to stipulated facts, which apparently did not include any evidence to
support appellants' assertions. Id. at 845.
80. Id. at 853.
81. 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990).
82. Id. at 1126.
83. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 854-55 ("In Pokorny, we recognized that Congress made its intention to give manufacturers safety options, including using manual seat belts, 'repeatedly ...clear in the regulatory history of
this particular safety standard.' ").
84. Id. at 855. The Third Circuit noted that appellants' argument could be
characterized in terms of "balance billing being an 'integral part' of the Medicare program," or in terms of balance billing as a congressionally created entitlement. Id. at 855 n.9. Either way, the issue for the court was "whether
Congress intended to protect the federal legislation from any state regulation."

Id.
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The Third Circuit concluded its analysis of the appellants' obstacle
arguments by analogizing the present case to the First Circuit's decision
in Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis.8 5 In Massachusetts Medical Society, the First Circuit upheld a Massachusetts statute which required, as a
condition of licensure, that physicians who accept Medicare patients accept assignment for those patients. 86 The First Circuit concluded that
the appellants failed to show clear and manifest evidence that Congress
intended to guarantee physicians the right to balance bill. 87 Despite the
fact that there had been significant amendments to the Medicare statute
relating to balance billing since 1987, the Third Circuit found the reasoning in MassachusettsMedical Society to be both persuasive and pertinent
to the instant case because the parties arguing preemption in both cases
relied on much of the same legislative history and many of the same
cases. 8 8 The Third Circuit concluded that the changes in the Medicare
statute since Massachusetts Medical Society support the validity and continuing relevance of the decision because Congress did not take advantage
of the opportunity to reverse the decision. 8 9 The court reasoned that at
most, the recent legislative history shows that Congress was not ready to
disturb the status quo. 90
85. 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1987).
86. Id. at 791; see also MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 2 (West 1985).
87. Massachusetts Medical Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 791-796. The Massachusetts

Medical Society argued that the Medicare Act itself and its legislative history
showed that Congress intended to protect the option to balance bill. Id. at 79293. First, the Massachusetts Medical Society argued that the structure of the
billing options, under which a physician who does not accept assignment must

bill the patient directly for the full fee rather than be guaranteed 80% payment
directly from Medicare, supported the inference that Congress intended to
protect balance billing as an option. Id. Presumably, its point was that the disincentive for balance billing is built into the Medicare Act. Second, the Massachusetts Medical Society argued that statements by several members of Congress

supported the inference that Congress intended to protect the option to balance
bill. Id. Third, the Massachusetts Medical Society argued that Congress expressly rejected proposals. to end balance billing. Id. After considering these
arguments, the First Circuit held that this evidence was insufficient to rebut the
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state law. Id. at 793-94.

The First Circuit also rejected the Massachusetts Medical Society's argument
that a ban on balance billing would reduce access to medical care. Id. at 795.
88. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 856. In particular, appellants in
both cases relied heavily on Congress' refusal to ban balance billing. Id. For a
discussion of recent amendments to the Medicare statute, see supra notes 24-32
and accompanying text.
89. Pennsylvania Medical Soc y, 942 F.2d at 857 ("[T]he amendments demonstrate that the right to balance bill is not sacrosanct and rather than protecting

balance billing [the amendments] limited it.").
90. Id. Another reasonable interpretation of this phenomenon is that Congress was not able to ban balance billing itself, but was willing to let the states do
SO.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 20

19921

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

D.

1077

Dissent

Chief Justice Sloviter disagreed with virtually every step in the majority's analysis. After concluding that the FCA was not entitled to a
presumption of validity, she challenged each element of the majority's
reasoning in rejecting appellants' substantive arguments.
ChiefJustice Sloviter agreed with the majority that state regulations
in areas traditionally within the states' police power are entitled to a presumption of validity. 9 ' She also agreed that regulation of public health
is within these traditional state powers. 92 Chief Justice Sloviter argued,
however, that a ban on balance billing which "regulates doctors' fees,
and in particular only certain doctors' fees charged to certain patients, is
[not] a matter of traditional state concern." 93 ChiefJustice Sloviter distinguished regulation of the "substantive practice of medicine," from
regulation of fees. 9 4 The former, which includes qualifications for licensing and quality of care, is clearly within traditional state powers; the
latter is not. 95 In fact, Chief Justice Sloviter apparently agreed with the
appellants' interpretation of Schneidewind, and argued that the FCA
should be subject to the general rule that non-neutral state laws which
96
target federal programs be viewed with suspicion.
Chief Justice Sloviter found that the majority's interpretation of
congressional intent was based on four elements: "a statement of legislative history, the awareness of Congress of several state laws precluding
balance billing, [the Massachusetts Medical Society decision], and 'the very
complexity of the Medicare legislation.' 97
ChiefJustice Sloviter argued that there are two problems with relying on the legislative history contained in the House Budget Committee
Report. First, "there is no way to ascertain whether this statement was
approved by the committee."'9 8 Second, and more importantly, the bill
underwent significant changes after the report was filed. 9 9 The Confer91. Id. at 858 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting).
93. Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Sloviter pointed out that
while such regulation might be permissible, "there has been no showing of a
history of state oversight over medical fees." Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting).
94. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) ("[lit is taking too great a leap to conclude that a state statute that regulates doctors' fees, and in particular only certain doctors' fees charged to certain patients, is a matter of traditional state
concern.").
96. Id. at 859 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). She argued that "[e]ven if we
would not hold that a state statute targeting participants in a federal program for
state regulation is presumptively invalid, it certainly should not be presumed to
be valid." Id. (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
For a discussion of Schneidewind, see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying
text.
97. Pennsylvania Medical Soc y, 942 F.2d at 859 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting).
98. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 861 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
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ence Report that accompanied the final bill contained "no language
whatsoever concerning state mandatory assignment laws."' 0 0 As to the
congressional silence in the face of state laws banning balance billing,
Chief Justice Sloviter argued that allowing congressional silence to defeat preemption arguments would defeat the whole idea of implicit
preemption. 101

ChiefJustice Sloviter was equally quick to reject the majority's reliance on Massachusetts Medical Society. She argued that Massachusetts Medical Society was probably wrongly decided because the First Circuit based
its decision on the presumption that the Massachusetts statute was
valid.' 0 2 Moreover, she argued that the changes in the Medicare legisla10 3
tion since 1987 rendered the opinion obsolete.
Finally, Chief Justice Sloviter argued that the complexity of the
Medicare statute more readily gives rise to the inference of an intent to
preempt than the contrary inference.' 0 4 The complexity of the statute
shows that Congress intended to regulate the entire field.' 0 5 Moreover,
ChiefJustice Sloviter argued that the fact that Congress did not ban balance billing when it had the opportunity, combined with the possibility
that such a ban would lead to reduced access to health care, is evidence
that Congress intended to leave balance billing intact.' 0 6 ChiefJustice
Sloviter closed her argument with the following analogy. A state law
100. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). For these reasons, the district court be-

low and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
in Medical Society of New York rejected this particular bit of legislative history. See
Medical Soc'y of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 777 F. Supp. 1157, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Marconis, 755 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 n.7 (W.D. Pa.),
arfd, 942 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1991).
101. Pennsylvania Medical Soc y, 942 F.2d at 859-60 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of the majority's interpretation of congressional silence,
see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
102. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 860 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting)
("Massachusetts Medical, however, reached its conclusion on the basis of a presumption of validity to the state law, which, as noted above, I believe is inapplicable in this situation.").
103. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) ("Massachusetts Medical is largely inappropriate to the present case because the regulatory landscape has changed considerably since that opinion was rendered.").
104. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 860-61 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Sloviter stated:
It is hard to imagine a legislative program that more completely occupies the field of balance billing by physicians than one that expressly
states which Medicare patients may not be subject to balance billing,
imposes a limit on the amount of balance billing for the remainder of
Medicare patients, and deals specifically and separately with certain defined services.
Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 861 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Sloviter noted that
when Congress increased the cap on balance billing, Congress showed that it
was in fact concerned with the effect restrictions on balance billing would have
on access to medical care. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 20

19921

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

1079

that changed the cap on balance billing to 50% or 15% of the allowable
charge in 1991 instead of the congressionally mandated 25% would
clearly be preempted. 10 7 Thus, a state law that reduced that cap to 0%
of the allowable charge (in essence, a ban on balance billing) should
similarly be preempted.' 0 8
III.

CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit's analysis of appellants' Supremacy Clause challenge to the FCA has two basic components. First, the Third Circuit
determined that the FCA is entitled to a presumption of validity because
it regulates an area within the traditional realm of state police power and
because there is no express preemption provision in the Medicare statute. 10 9 Second, the Third Circuit determined that the appellants were
unable to provide the clear and manifest evidence of congressional intent to preempt required to rebut the presumption of validity. " 0 More
specifically, the appellants were unable to demonstrate that Congress
intended to occupy the field of Medicare balance billing practices to the
exclusion of the states, and that state regulation of Medicare balance
billing practices would interfere with the goals of the Medicare
Program. I I'
The ultimate question in any presumption analysis is whether Congress intended to preempt state law.' 12 There is little doubt that the
Third Circuit correctly interpreted congressional intent in this case by
holding that Congress did not intend to preempt state law. The fact that
Congress did not act to expressly preempt existing state laws restricting
balance billing is extremely persuasive, notwithstanding the normal hesitance to give congressional inaction too much weight. Perhaps the
more interesting question is whether allowing states to experiment with
variations of the Medicare program is a positive step towards finding a
system that provides universal access to quality health care at an affordable price.
Congress itself has experimented with many possible approaches to
107. Id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). In Medical Society of New York, however,
the court disagreed with the premise of this analogy and upheld a statute which
reduced the amount physicians can balance bill in New York. Medical Soc'y of
N.Y. v. Cuomo, 777 F. Supp. 1157, 1159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
For a discussion of Medical Society of New York, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
108. Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 861 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
109. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see supra notes 42-51 and

accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of appellants' failure to provide the clear and manifest evidence of congressional intent to preempt, which is required to rebut the
presumption of validity, see supra notes 52-90 and accompanying text.
111. For a discussion of appellants' argument regarding the goals of the
Medicare Program, see supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.

112. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 848.
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this challenge.' 13 Congress' current approach is to place absolute caps
on fees and provide incentives for physicians to accept a standard fee
somewhat lower than the absolute maximum allowed fee.' 14 No one
argues, however, that Congress has found the ideal solution to the
health care crisis. Allowing states to experiment with variations of the
Medicare program gives Congress a chance to observe several different
systems in action before committing to any one on a national scale.
Of course, many, especially those in the health care industry, will be
dubious of any state solution that reduces fees paid to health care providers. '5 Their position is not without merit. It is certainly plausible
that such reductions might compromise access to quality health care.
But if one considers the original challenges of limiting costs and providing adequate access to care, it is clear that a balance must be found.
What is not clear is where the balance should lie. State experimentation
is perhaps the most efficient way of finding the best balance, and there is
little danger in allowing this experimentation, especially when the scope
of the experimentation is so narrow. If costs increase instead of decrease, or if access to quality care is reduced, then the states can be
counted upon, at least as much as the federal government, to act in the
best interests of their citizens. Perhaps through experimentation, individual states can find a more successful balance.
R. Anthony Diehl
113. Pennsylvania Medical Soc y, 942 F.2d at 844-45 (discussing congressional experimentation through amendments to Medicare Act).
114. For a discussion of Medicare billing practices, see supra notes 15-32
and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y, 942 F.2d at 853 (discussing appellants' argument that FCA interferes with goals of Medicare program by reducing
access to health care).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

17

